Government Experimental Project on Comprehensive Recovery of Settlements Failed to Achieve Its Objectives

Based on a report by the Dozorro monitoring portal of Transparency International Ukraine dated 31 August 2026 (abridged)

The government’s experimental project for the recovery of settlements affected by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation (see Resolution No. 382 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 25 April 2023), implemented in 2023–2025, ended without the complete recovery of any of the selected settlements.

Initially, six settlements were included in the project: the urban-type settlement of Borodyanka and the village of Moshchun in Kyiv region; the city of Trostianets in Sumy region; the village of Posad-Pokrovske in Kherson region; the village of Tsyrkuny in Kharkiv region; and the village of Yahidne in Chernihiv region.

However, problems emerged as early as the first year of implementation. Due to the lack of a unified approach to selecting recovery projects, the recovery of Moshchun effectively dropped out of the experiment, while only one of nearly 300 planned facilities was completed.

No significant progress was achieved during the second year either. At the same time, the list of recovery facilities doubled compared with the initial plan, increasing from 295 to 593. Problems with the actual allocation of funding, which had emerged at the beginning of the project, effectively undermined the ability to implement it on time and efficiently. As a result, another 57 facilities were completed during the second year, meaning that slightly more than 9% of the total planned number had been completed over the first two years.

According to an analysis by the Dozorro monitoring portal, 80 facilities had been completed under the project as of the end of May 2026. The highest completion rate was recorded in Borodyanka, where 42.9% of the planned buildings had been restored. In Posad-Pokrovske, which had the largest number of facilities, only 2.6% had been completed. In Tsyrkuny, none of the two planned facilities had been completed as of August 2026. Due to the security situation, construction work had not begun: project documentation had been prepared, but procurement procedures for construction works had not been announced.

Analysts identify untimely and unpredictable funding as one of the main causes of delays. Over two and a half years, UAH 3.99 billion was allocated to the project — approximately one-third of its expected cost. At the same time, 73% of the funds actually allocated were provided during the final year of the experiment.

Overall, the state approved project funding of UAH 9.06 billion. However, delays in the actual disbursement of funds complicated the planning and implementation of the works.

Other problems identified by the researchers included repeated changes to the lists of facilities, adjustments to project documentation, the failure to transfer the functions of the client from private owners, insufficient experience of regional recovery services in constructing housing and social infrastructure, and security risks.

Within the project, contracts were terminated more than 2.5 times as frequently as in similar procurements outside the project. At the same time, average competition in open tenders fell from 3.6 to 1.5 bidders per lot.

After the formal completion of the experiment, the state continued the recovery of unfinished facilities. They were included in the budget programme for the implementation of public investment projects (see Resolution No. 650 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 15 May 2026), designed for a four-year period. The programme covers five settlements and 591 facilities.

For the continuation of works in 2026, the Government allocated UAH 1.94 billion. According to the study, these funds were also disbursed with delays. The estimated additional funding required to complete all facilities amounts to another UAH 4.92 billion.

The experimental project was also audited by the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. Following the audit, it concluded that the project had failed to achieve its objectives and had been implemented without an adequate strategic, organizational, or financial framework.

The experiment demonstrated that comprehensive recovery cannot be reduced to a set of individual construction projects financed unpredictably on an annual basis. Effective implementation requires integrated spatial planning, community participation, properly prepared projects, continuous funding, and clear accountability for results.

Photo source: https://www.magnific.com/